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Chapter 1: Introduction
Aligning both owner and contractor objectives is widely thought to be a
catalyst for better project performance. For this very reason, contract incentives
are employed in order to identify and ensure focus on the owner's goals. The
scope of this report is to research the extent of use and consequent effects of
construction contract incentives offered by owners. The relative use by owners of
construction phase incentives will be characterized, and an incentive use index
assigned to each project. Additionally, the impacts of incentive use in terms of
cost, schedule, and safety will be investigated. A relationship between the
relative incentive use (incentive index) and project performance will also be
examined.
This research will be accomplished using the Construction Industry
Institutes' (CII) Benchmarking and Metrics version 1.0 and 2.0 database. This
database includes responses from both owners and contractors. Since owners are
the ones who will ultimately decide on the inclusion of any incentives, only their
responses will be examined.
Reducing cost and schedule growth on a project is quite often a primary
goal of an owner. This study will show how the use of cost and schedule
incentives affects the cost growth and schedule growth of the construction phase
There are several objectives that this study aims to accomplish. This
research should provide both the public and private owner with a foundation to
aid them in their decision to use certain types of contract incentives.
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Additionally, it is anticipated that private projects will have a higher relative
incentive use index as opposed to public projects, and this research will attempt to
show how the increased use of various incentives will affect project performance.
Positive incentives undoubtedly have a different impact on project
performance as opposed to negative incentives (penalties, liquidated damages,
etc.). The types of incentives employed by owners will be examined for their
relative significance and impending results. Safety incentives will be studied to
determine their impact on a project's "Recordable Incident Rate" (RIR) and "Lost
Workday Case Incident Rate" (LWCIR), as defined by the Occupational and
Health Administration (OSHA).
1.1 Research questions.
There are several specific research questions that will be answered in this
report. They are as follows:
• Does the use of positive safety incentives reduce a project's RIR
and LWCIR?
• Does the use of positive (including combination positive/negative)
cost incentives produce lower cost growth?
• Is the use of only negative schedule incentives (liquidated damages
etc.) counterproductive to reducing schedule growth?
• Does the combined use of positive and negative schedule
incentives reduce schedule growth?
• Does a higher incentive use index result in better project
performance in terms of schedule and cost?

1.2 Hypotheses
For purposes of this study, the following hypotheses are offered using the
null hypothesis approach:
• The use of positive safety incentives has no effect on a
project's RIR or LWCIR;
• The use of positive (including combined positive/negative) cost
incentives does not lower cost growth;
• The use of only negative schedule incentives has no effect on
schedule growth;
• The combined use of positive and negative schedule incentives
does not reduce schedule growth;
• A higher incentive use index does not result in better cost and
schedule performance.
Chapter 2 of this report will include an extensive review of past literature
and research concerning incentives. A brief discussion concerning the database
utilized, as well as the analysis procedures, will follow in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
presents the analysis of each of the hypotheses and also includes a
characterization of the data received from each of the respondents. Last,
conclusions and recommendations on the use of contract incentives will be
presented in Chapter 5. This thesis should aid both public and private entities
with their procurement strategies.

Chapter 2: Background
2.1 Benchmarking and Metrics at en
The Construction Industry Institute (CII) is an organization of owners and
contractors based administratively at the University of Texas at Austin. CII is
primarily a research organization whose mission is:
"...to improve the safety, quality, schedule, and cost effectiveness
of the capital investment process through research and
implementation support for the purpose of providing a competitive
advantage to North American business in the global marketplace."
(Hudson 1997).
The CII Board of Advisors established a Benchmarking and Metrics
Committee in 1993, whose objectives were to establish a series of metrics that
could be applied to all sectors of the construction industry and identify "best
practices" that could be used to positively influence the metrics being measured.
All of the data utilized for analysis in this thesis were obtained from CII's
Benchmarking and Metrics (BM&M) database. The CII BM&M committee has
identified three objectives. They are as follows:
To provide "the industry" (defined broadly as heavy industrial,
light industrial, buildings, and infrastructure) with "norms";
To measure the use of "best practices" and quantify the value
of implementing CII recommended practices;
To help educate the industry in benchmarking practices and
interpretation of data for improvement within their respective
companies (CII BM&M Report 1997).

A primary difference between CII's benchmarking approach and
benchmarking services offered by other organizations is the level of analysis and
feedback provided to individual companies. CII seeks to provide companies with
tools to allow in-house analysis of project performance, rather than provide
extensive individual project analysis. Individual companies will thus be in a
better position to improve. The tools include: a set of well defined performance
metrics, a report of industry "norms" for comparison purposes, and reports of
general analysis which identify practices that correlate with successful project
performance.
2.2 Contract Incentives
The following literature review has been completed in order to provide the
author of this report with a strong foundation of knowledge on the purpose and
use of construction contract incentives. There was a large sample of literature
available for review, probably due to the fact that owners and contractors are now,
more than ever, trying to streamline their goals so as to derive mutual benefits.
This review will be broken down into several categories that ultimately relate to
the research questions already mentioned.
The purpose of contract incentives will be discussed first, followed by a
discussion on owner and contractor goals and objectives for construction projects.
Risk allocation and motivational theory will then be discussed, followed by a
brief comparison of incentive contracting with Total Quality Management (TQM)

principles. Owner and contractor goals, risk allocation, and motivational theory
are the main factors in the success or failure of any incentive plan. These topics
are invaluable to the comprehension of incentive contracting. The remainder of
the literature review will focus on the different types of incentives available to
owners, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of their use.
The word "incentive" is derived from a Latin word meaning, "to
stimulate", and when incentives are properly employed, they can stimulate
contractors to support, and perhaps even adopt, the goals and objectives of the
owner (Neil 1990). Stukhart points out that contract incentives "are the means by
which an owner intends to secure certain project goals through the contracting
process" (Stukhart 1984). Put more simply, they encourage the contractor to
adopt the owners project objectives, essentially making them mutual objectives.
By doing so, both the owner and contractor will ideally maximize their respective
benefits, assuming a proper incentive plan is developed. Since one of the main
motivators for a contractor is often profit, money awards are the most frequently
employed incentives.
So what are project goals? They may be an assortment of many things.
The main goals that incentives support are reduced cost, reduced project duration
(schedule), increased safety performance, and better quality. The aforementioned
goals are usually adopted by both the owner and contractor, albeit each usually
occupying a different priority. Neil points out that owners are finding that

incentives are a valuable tool in supporting other goals such as the improvement
of day-to-day management of work, maintaining favorable labor relations,
assuring commitment of the best personnel by the contractor, and improving
owner/contractor communication and cooperation (Neil 1990). Admittedly, by
effectively motivating a contractor to focus on goals such as reduced cost,
reduced schedule growth, and reduced accidents, these "indirect" goals are likely
to follow suit.
The Construction Industry Institute reported in 1995 that incentives
improve performance in the following ways:
They drive the definition of the project;
They align project participants on common objectives;
They create an interdependence among project participants;
They establish a mutually supportive environment;
They open communication channels and enhance team building;
They reward desired behavior.
Again, by establishing incentives for project performance, the above goals
are more likely to be realized.
Before continuing, it is important to point out "what contract incentives
are not." They are not payment for risk assumption. The contractor should not
receive a bonus for the random occurrence of events beyond its control (Ashley
1986). Incentives are paid when a contractor meets or exceeds previously
identified standards of performance, of which they have direct control.

As previously mentioned, the purpose of contract incentives is to bring the
objectives of the contractor in line with those of the owner. These objectives need
to be communicated effectively to the contractor if the desired results are to be
realized. Unless the objectives are clearly understood by both parties, they will
not be effective (Stukhart 1984). Generally speaking, the owner of a project will
usually have three accepted goals: most economical cost, specified quality, and
on-time completion (Stukhart 1984). The contractor will typically maintain the
obvious goal of maximizing his or her their profit. Other goals and objectives do
exist, and these will be discussed in the upcoming paragraphs.
Both owners and contractors must realize that risk is a principle that must
be shared, and contractors must be able to control the resources necessary to
achieve the incentives. Risk should be commensurate with potential gains.
Stukhart (1984) defines risk as the exposure to possible economic loss or gain.
He further states that risk allocation is very important in order for incentives to be
effective. Risk is allocated to contracting parties in order to motivate them to
perform in a professional manner. It is based in part on the return of profit to be
realized. As previously mentioned, the degree of control over the risk must be
considered. Responsibility for an end result must entail complete control over its
occurrence. Finally, the relative "ability" of the parties to protect themselves
against the risk is also a major consideration (Stukhart 1984).

Ashley and Workman (1986) developed some factors to consider in
determining the optimum allocation of risk. They include:
• The perception of risk;
• The controllability of risk (accountability without control costs
money);
• Preference for risk assumption (ability to absorb or insure
against it);
• The opportunity of risk (incentive value of risk)
Ibbs and Abu-Hijleh (1988) state that "excessive risk" offers no incentive
value. They further state that it is in the owners best interest not to pass on all
risks to the contractor; otherwise adversarial relationships will develop which
counteract the goals of the incentive process. In summary, performance can be
encouraged by the simple allocation of reasonable risk.
Since incentives are enacted to help "motivate" a contractor, the next few
paragraphs will discuss motivational theory. Degoff and Freeman (1985) write
that motivation is best defined in terms of its behavioral operations and that it is
foremost, "goal oriented." It incites and directs an individual's action to
accomplish a task. Ashley and Workman (1986) state that motivation is "a drive
to satisfy a need or desire through goal attainment." Furthermore, the needs and
desires of any contractor can be reduced to profit maximization. This goal
constitutes a self-motivation in construction contracting. Effective motivation in
contracting requires the adoption, at least indirectly, of the owner's project
objectives by the contractor. This is the role of incentives: to motivate.
Stukhart (1984) feels that in a fixed-price contract, "the contractor
achieves a major motivational factor, the desire to be in control of one's fate, ..."
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The problem with most fixed-price contracts is that most are written
without the involvement of the contractor, and adhesive terms often dictated to
the contractor. Although the contractor is still in control of its destiny, other
important success factors may be absent (communications, non-adversarial
relationships, shared goals and objectives, etc.). Incentives help to derive the
benefits of these other success factors.
The aforementioned principles are, at least in part, consistent with the
goals of the Total Quality Management (TQM) process. The Transit Cooperative
Research Program Report 8 stated that TQM change is about how organizations
"perform work, get better at what they do, ...and inspire and reward their people"
(TCRP Report 8, 1995). Just as the TQM process moves from the traditional,
outdated mode of operation, to a newer, more progressive way of operation, one
which improves and evolves continuously, so does the ideal incentive process.
The TQM roadmap included in Report 8 identifies three distinct phases:
Foundation, Momentum, and Commitment. These three phases are attributable to
an effective incentive process as well. The Foundation phase forms the team,
discusses shared goals and objectives, clarifies other values and expectations, and
identifies satisfaction criteria. The Momentum phase further clarifies
expectations, as well as recognizes and rewards desired behavior. The
Commitment phase implements the management systems, establishes processes,
and evaluates and improves through an appraisal system (TCRP Report 8 1995).
Certainly the TQM process is substantially more involved than a simple contract
incentive, however it can be safely said that the incentive process seeks the same
10

end result as the TQM process, and accomplishes those goals in much the same
manner.
There are a multitude of types of incentives available to owners.
Depending upon the desired outcome of a project, the proper incentive(s) can be
selected. Positive incentives reward a contractor for desired results, whereas
negative incentives attempt to dissuade poor performance in specific areas by
decreasing the amount of a contractor's fee. Incentives can be based on safety,
cost, schedule, quality, and they exist in other fashions which will soon be
discussed.
Most would agree that the best contractual incentive programs have a
"win" feature. Those with only a "lose" potential are generally frowned upon
(Neil 1990). A "win" feature is essentially a positive incentive, and a "lose"
feature a negative incentive. A positive incentive focuses on the desired outcome,
and rewards this desired outcome in a positive way, usually in the form of a
monetary award. Positive incentives encourage positive contractor actions,
behaviors, and relationships, as opposed to negative incentives (liquidated
damages, which assess a penalty for late completion, are considered a negative
incentive) (Neil 1990). Ashley and Workman (1986) point out that research has
demonstrated that positive incentives contribute to improved project results, while
negative incentives generally hamper project performance.
A combination of positive and negative incentives may be the solution for
owners who are a skeptical of a "positive" only approach. Bechtel Group has
used combined positive/negative incentives to avoid sub-optimized project
11

performance with great success. Combined incentives and cost sharing generally
keep the contractor in good alignment with the customer's objectives and can be
combined with schedule, safety,... and output performance incentives to match
and balance contractor incentives with customer objectives (CII, 1995). This
report further states that combined incentives, although difficult to administer,
have proven fairly successful. Thus an educated, knowledgeable owner with the
requisite resources could benefit from the use of combined incentives.
The following is a list of positive and negative incentives that have been
utilized in the past:
Positive Incentives
• Awards for low or zero RIR/LWCIR (see Chapter 3 for
definition);
• Awards for completion of construction under budget or under a
guaranteed maximum price (GMP);
• Bonuses for meeting or exceeding target completion dates and
milestone dates;
• Report card bonuses which take into account a contractor's
overall performance over a designated period;
• The possibility of being selected by the owner as a long-term
partner, or establishing a strategic alliance;
• The "Golden Letter"-a letter of commendation written by the
owner for a job well done. This gives the contractor something
of considerable market value;
• Preference on additional, future work
Negative Incentives
• Liquidated damages for late completion of an established
milestone or overall completion date;
• Cost sharing or reduced fee for exceeding a construction
budget (applicable in cost reimbursable type contracts);
12

• Increased retainage for undesirable performance (Neil 1990).
When an owner is a government contracting agency, it is usually required
to accept low bids, and has difficulty employing most of the non-monetary
incentives discussed (with the exception of the "Golden Letter").
2.3 Keys to incentive use success
For all the above incentive plans to work, it is crucial that the criteria be
identified and agreed upon well in advance. Negotiated targets result in greater
ownership and commitment by the contractor (Ibbs and Abu-Hijleh 1989). In
addition, a cooperative relationship between the parties is considered instrumental
in reducing project uncertainty and increasing the chances for project success (CII
Pub. 24-1). Furthermore, owner personnel must genuinely want the contractor to
achieve the maximum incentive because it corresponds to maximum owner
success (CII Conference Packet 1996). Jaraiedi, Plummer, and Aber (1995) state
that it is important for the contracting agency or owner to do everything possible
to eliminate delays and disruptions. This essentially means that extra time and
effort must be given to project development so as to avoid costly changes once the
project begins. These changes not only affect the cost, but may impact the
completion of a milestone or the entire construction process. If changes are made
deadlines and targets should be adjusted so the contractor does not suffer a
reduced award for circumstances that are the fault of the owner.
13

Even with all of the possible advantages of using incentives, there are
some disadvantages as well. Positive incentives require substantially more
contract administration. Ashley and Workman state that contracts with positive
incentives appear to have stricter enforcement, greater disputes, and more
suggested improvement than contracts without positive incentives (with the
exception of positive cost incentives) (Ashley and Workman 1986). There is a
tendency for owners to induce the contractor to accept more risk with incentives,
which, as stated earlier, is not the purpose of incentives. Ashley and Workman
(1986) identified some of the major disadvantages of incentives, as seen by the
Business Roundtable:
• Owner's difficulty in establishing fair and equitable targets;
• Owner's additional administrative costs;
• Extra negotiations needed for implementation;
• Changes in owner priorities, beyond the contractor's control,
require adjustment and possible re-negotiation of targets.
These disadvantages can be overcome with the proper awareness and
management. It is possible to derive the positive benefits from incentive use, and
CII (1995) has provided the following lessons learned and recommendations for
incentive use:
• Align project incentives with key business success
opportunities;
• Make incentives measurable and objective, using relevant
benchmarks;
• Include (and preserve) incentive funding at expected outcome
levels;
• Frequently share expectations and results;
• Link incentives to outcomes that reasonably can be controlled;
• Incentives alone do not ensure project success.
14

Chapter 3: Research Methodology
All of the data used to analyze incentive use was obtained from the
Construction Industry Institute (CII). The data includes accumulated data,
otherwise known as the Benchmarking and Metrics (BM&M) Database collected
over a two-year period from 1996 through 1997. This database consists of 393
owner and contractor projects totaling over $20.6 billion in cost. Most of the
projects are classified as "Heavy Industrial" and are located in the United States
and Canada (CII BM&M Report 1997). Since the purpose of this thesis is to
determine whether or not construction contract incentives can help owners or
procurement agencies reach their goals, only the owner data were analyzed.
Most of the resources utilized for the literature review were found in the
Engineering Library at the University of Texas at Austin. A few items were
borrowed or purchased from CII, where a significant amount of literature
concerning construction is available. There was ample material to conduct a
comprehensive literature review.
The BM&M database includes two years of accumulated data. The files
for each year are maintained separately, thus a significant amount of time was
spent simply stratifying the data from the 1996 files (Version 1.0), and the 1997
files (Version 2.0). The incentive use information for each respective project was
included in a separate file from that of the general project information and much
time was spent transferring the appropriate incentive information to the file
containing the general project information. This incentive information referred to
15

was simply each owners' reply concerning the use of cost, schedule, and safety
incentives, as well as the type used (positive, negative, or both) if any. Figures
3.2 and 3.3 at the end of this chapter show how each incentive question was
prepared in Version 1.0 and 2.0 respectively. Figure 3.1 is an easy reference flow





Gather data (CII Database)









Combine Version 1.0/2.0 into 1 file
Determine cost growth, schedule
growth, RIR, and LWCIR for each
project





Conduct necessary statistical analysis
Make conclusion and
recommendations
Figure 3.1: Research methodology flowchart
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Once the appropriate incentive information was included with each file,
both versions of data were screened and all of the data unrelated to this research
was deleted so as to provide for a more streamlined, easy to manipulate, file. The
major information that was kept (refer to Appendix B) included the project
number, public or private contract, incentives used, construction budget,
construction cost, planned schedule, as-built schedule, as well as the number of
recordable and lost workday case incidents for each respective project.
Finally, both versions 1.0 and 2.0 needed to be combined into one file in
order to conduct the appropriate analysis. Each column of data had to contain the
exact type of information as that particular column from the other file. After both
versions of data were combined into one master spreadsheet, the data were ready
for analysis.
The spreadsheet program used for this entire process (and for graph
development) was Microsoft Excel™ . This program made for simple sorting of
data. Each time an analysis was made using a different dependent variable, the
appropriate sort function could be carried out from the master file. For example,
when analyzing safety performance versus safety incentive use, the database was
sorted by the column containing the incentive type used (if any), with the RIR and
LWCIR subsequently being calculated. Projects lacking the necessary data to
evaluate safety performance were simply deleted from that particular analysis (a
project that gave no information on the lost workday cases may still be valuable
when evaluating cost growth).
17

Below are the formulas used during the analysis portion of this research.
With the exception of the incentive use index, all formulas are in the same format
used by the CII benchmarking committee.
• Safety Performance:
1. Recordable Incident Rate (RIR):
(# recordable incidents)/(# craft work hours) * (200 K w-h/yr).
2. Lost Workday Case Incident Rate (LWCIR):
(# lost workday cases)/(# craft work hours) * (200 K w-h/yr).
• Construction Cost Growth:
(Actual Construction Cost-Budgeted Construction Cost)/Actual Cost.
• Construction Schedule Growth:
(Actual Construction Duration-Predicted Duration)/Predicted Duration
• Incentive Use Index:
The total number of incentives used on a project. The range is
between and 6, and accounts for safety, cost, and schedule incentives
only. For example, if a project employs both positive and negative
schedule incentives, the corresponding incentive use index would be 2.
Hypothesis testing was performed using statistical analysis. This analysis
essentially compares the relative values of two means to determine if the
difference between them, if any, is significant or can be attributed to chance.
Using either the z or t statistic, an analysis can be made. For analysis containing
30 or more projects in the sample, the z statistic is used. For analysis containing
less than 30 samples, the t statistic is used (Blank, 1980). All the analyses (except
for the one concerning the evaluation of negative-only schedule incentives where
the t statistic is used) used the z-statistic since each analysis sub-sample contained
more than 30 projects.
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The objective of these tests is to determine whether the means of two
samples of projects are equal to each other at a certain level of significance. By
establishing the null hypothesis [Mean of sample 1 = Mean of sample 2:((ii=(i.2)],
one can prove if the two samples are considered equal or not. Unless the null
hypothesis is accepted, the means are not considered equal. If the null hypothesis
is accepted, one can conclude that any difference in the two populations is
attributable to chance or sampling error, and not due to whether or not incentives
were used. The level of significance used to prove or disprove the Null
hypothesis in this thesis is 95%. The z-values are also compared to the
acceptance range at 90% confidence, as well as other values if it could be shown
to be significant. The formulas used for calculation of the z-value are as follows:
ad=((ai)
2/N, + (a2 )
2/N2 )
5
(a=standard deviation, N = number of projects in sample)
z=(Hi-(i-2)/ ad .
(|i=mean)
The Null hypothesis acceptance ranges at various levels of confidence are
shown below:
95%: z-value from -1.96 to 1.96
90%: z-value from -1.645 to 1.645
86.7%: z-value from -1.5 to 1.5
80%: z-value from -1.282 to 1.282




1 1 . Contract Incentives (for each phase and incentive category check whether contracts included
positive, negative, or no incentives. A cash award for meeting a milestone is an example of a positive
incentive, and liquidated damages for failing to meet a milestone is an example of a negative incentive
List other incentivized objectives in the blanks provided. If your company solely performed the duties
required in a phase, leave blank)
Pre-project
planning
Design Procurement Construct Start-up









Figure 3.2: Version 1.0 Incentive use question
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(Version 2.0: Question 10)
If Contract Incentives were utilized, please indicate whether those incentives
were positive (a financial incentive for attaining an objective), negative (a
financial disincentive for failure to achieve an objective), or both. Circle "+" to
























(circle as many as apply)
Cost Schedule Safety Quality
Y N + _ + _ 4 4- _
Y N + - + - 4 4- -
Y N + - + - 4 4- -
Y N + - 4- - 4 + -
Y N + - + - 4 4- -
Y N + - + - 4 4- -
Y N + - + - 4 + -
Y N + - + - 4 + -





This analysis was conducted on 183 owner-submitted projects. None of
the data submitted to CII by any contractor was considered. Before any
hypothesis testing was done, the sample was first broken down several different
ways in order to characterize the diversity of projects. All of the descriptions
provided are presented in both graphical and written format throughout the
chapter.
Figure 4.1 shows the sample projects in terms of "Industry Type." Any
project submitted to CII is included in one of four possible categories. The
categories are building projects, heavy industrial projects, light industrial projects,
and infrastructure projects. Examples of each type are as follows:
• Heavy Industrial Projects-Electrical Generating, Oil
Exploration & Production, Oil Refining, Pulp and Paper,
Chemical Manufacturing, Environmental, Metals Refining &
Processing, and Natural Gas Processing;
• Light Industrial Projects-Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing,
Consumer Products Manufacturing, Microelectronics




• Infrastructure Projects-Electrical Distribution, Highway,
Navigation, Flood Control, Rail, Water/Wastewater, Airport,
Tunneling, Marine Facilities, and Mining;
• Buildings-Lowrise/Highrise Office, Warehouse, Hospital,
Laboratory, School, Prison, Hotel, Maintenance Facilities,
Parking Garage, and Retail.











D Light Industrial (n=29)
D Infrastructure (n=14)
54%
Figure 4.1: Breakdown of database by industry type
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the majority of the projects are heavy
industrial. A total of 100 projects, constituting 54 percent of the database, were
heavy industrial. The next largest group was the building projects, which
numbered 40 in all (22 percent). The remaining sample projects included 29 light
23

industrial projects (16 percent) and 14 infrastructure projects (8 percent). As
noted in the figure, these projects were from all cost categories.
The types of projects submitted were further classified as being
modernization, grass roots, or add-on projects. Modernization projects are
facilities for which a substantial amount of the equipment, structure, or other
components are replaced or modified, and which may expand capacity and/or
improve the process or facility. Grass roots projects are where a new facility is
built from the foundation and up. A project requiring demolition of an existing
facility before new construction begins is also classified as grass roots. Add-on or
addition projects are those where a new addition ties in to an existing facility,
often intended to expand capacity.
The projects were essentially evenly distributed among the three project
types. Figure 4.2 shows this distribution. A total of 65 projects were classified as
grass roots (36 percent), while the remaining 118 projects were split evenly
between modernization and addition projects (32 percent each). This even
distribution of projects is probably less significant than the uneven distribution in
terms of industry type, given the wide range of cost and scope.
24

Breakdown of Version 1.0/2.0 Database
Respondent: Owner
Cost Categories: All











| Total Projects=183 "^H
36%
Figure 4.2: Breakdown of database by project type










Figure 4.3: Number of public and private projects in database
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The database was dominated by private projects, as shown on the previous
page in Figure 4.3. A total of 81 percent, 143 out of the 183 projects, were from
the private sector. The portion of public projects represented a mere 19 percent,
35 in all, of the data. Although this is unbalanced, there is still enough data to
provide some significant comparisons between the two populations.
Public and private entities were each evaluated based on their respective
incentive use. Each group was looked at individually and the amount of projects
utilizing cost, schedule, and safety incentives (all types) was determined. Figure
4.4 and Figure 4.5 illustrate the public and private use of incentives. Some
projects had multiple incentives and are reported in more than one category.










































Figure 4.5: Types of incentives used by public and private entities
As was anticipated, private entities used cost incentives a great deal more
than public. In fact, they employed them almost three times as much. The private
sector reported a 30 percent use rate, while the public reported just over 1
1
percent. Since most public entities are constrained by narrow procurement
statutes, which mandate the acceptance of the lowest responsible, responsive
bidder, this is not surprising. As Figure 4.5 shows however, there were four
public projects that reported the use of positive cost incentives. All four of these
projects were classified as electrical additions (modernization projects). It is
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interesting to note that three of these four projects were procured on a cost-
reimbursable basis, which lends itself perfectly to the use of cost incentive use.
It is quite obvious why the private sector uses cost incentives. They are
attempting to control expenditures so that the maximum return on investment may
be realized. Private entities are in business to make profit, and by sharing any
cost savings with the contractor, they feel they may be increasing their chances of
realizing this goal. As Figure 4.4 shows, a total of 45 private projects included
cost incentives (30.4 percent). Of these 45 projects, only one utilized a negative-
only incentive approach.
The calculated use of schedule incentives, also shown in Figure 4.4,
provided interesting results. Of the 35 public projects, 17 employed some type of
schedule incentive, almost 50 percent. Figure 4.5 shows that, of these 17 projects,
1 1 utilized negative-only incentives (most likely the assessment of liquidated
damages for late completion). Three projects reported the use of positive-only
incentives, and the remaining three public projects used a combination of positive
and negative schedule incentives.
The private use of schedule incentives was similar to their use of cost
incentives. There were 47 private projects that contained some type of schedule
incentive, which amounted to just under 32 percent (see Figure 4.4). In contrast
again with public entities, Figure 4.5 shows that 30 of these 47 projects utilized
positive schedule incentives. Only three of the 148 private projects utilized a
negative-only schedule incentive. A total of 14 projects included both positive
and negative schedule incentives. This thesis will attempt to show that the use of
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negative-only schedule incentives is counterproductive. Private owners seem to
have adopted the same theory by looking at their overall schedule incentive use.
The comparative use of safety incentives was similar to that of cost
incentives and is also included in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Only three of the public
projects utilized a safety incentive, a total of only 8.6 percent. A significant
number of private entities did, however, use safety incentives. A total of 54 out of
the 148 private projects (36.5 percent) employed them. Figure 4.5 indicates the
types of safety incentives utilized were essentially all positive, although two
private projects reported the use of negative-only safety incentives, and six private
projects employed a combination of positive and negative incentives.
As is the case with cost incentives, it is likely difficult for public owners to
justify the use of safety incentives. Under constant scrutiny from the general
public, incentive use is a "hard sell." Private firms are free to employ any kind of
incentive that they wish in order to help them realize their goals. Reducing the
number of accidents on a private project is probably a higher priority due to the
litigious atmosphere that has recently developed. Third party lawsuits are more
likely to be filed against a private entity than a public one. Most public contracts
contain a significant amount of exculpatory language that indemnifies them
anyway. CII has estimated that a Recordable Incident (RI) costs approximately
$1100, and a Lost Workday Case (LWC) costs almost $50,000. If safety
incentives can be shown to reduce the RIR and LWCIR on a project, not only will
significant money be saved by all parties involved in the construction process, the
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intangible effects of a safer jobsite like better moral, higher productivity and
better efficiency will abound.
The next comparison made was the relative incentive use among the
respective industry types, shown in Figure 4.6. The largest representative group,
heavy industrial projects, also recorded the most incentive use among the industry
types. Of the 100 heavy industrial projects, 37 (37 percent) employed some type
of cost incentive, almost double the percentage of all the other industry types.
Schedule incentive use was slightly higher at 40 percent, and an even higher
number of heavy industrial projects, 44 percent, utilized safety incentives.
At the low end, except for schedule incentive use, was the building
industry. Only four of these projects (10 percent) utilized a cost incentive, and an
even lower number, 7.5 percent, employed safety incentives. It would be
interesting to see the overall RIR's and LWCIR's for each industry type to
determine if one is considered safer than the rest. The incentive use rates
indicated in Figure 4.6 are not assumed to be representative of the construction
industry as a whole. Building projects did record the second highest schedule
incentive use at 35 percent.
The light industrial and infrastructure projects were similar in their use
rates. Cost incentives were employed 14.3 percent and 20.7 percent of the time
respectively. Schedule incentives were seen on 21.4 percent of light industrial
projects, and on 24.1 percent of the infrastructure projects. Safety incentive use
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Figure 4.6: Incentive use within each industry type
Incentive use was also characterized in terms of project nature. Figure 4.7
shows how the 183 projects utilized incentives from the perspective of project
type. Grass roots projects indicated the highest overall incentive use. Of the 65
grass roots projects, 22 utilized some type of cost incentive (33.8 percent), with
over 40 percent containing a schedule incentive (27 total). Addition and
modernization projects had similar use rates. Of the 59 addition and
modernization projects, 22 percent and 23.7 percent employed cost incentives
respectively, approximately 10 percent below that of grass roots. Schedule
incentive use in these two categories was also approximately 10 percent below
that of the grass roots projects. Addition projects utilized them 30.5 percent of the
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time, while modernization projects employed them slightly more at 32.2 percent
of the time. All three categories reported safety incentive use at slightly over












Add-On (n=59) Grass Roots (n=65)
Category of Construction
Modernization (n=59)
Figure 4.7: Incentive among each construction category
Given that most of the projects are of the heavy industrial type, it is not
surprising that the grass roots projects contain more schedule incentives than the
rest, since a quicker completion of the new facility may result in a quicker return
on investment.
The final comparison for characterization purposes is provided in Figure
4.8. This graph shows the average Incentive Use Index for both public and
private entities. As was shown in the previous paragraphs, private projects
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generally contain a higher percentage of incentives when compared to public
projects. The possible score for the Incentive Use Index is in the range of 0-6.
Private projects had an average index rating of 1.2, 33 percent higher than the
public projects' average rating of 0.8. This seems to be consistent with logical
thought. Later, this report will attempt to correlate a higher incentive use index
with improved project performance. The development of the incentive use index
was discussed in chapter 3.

























Figure 4.8: Average Incentive Use Index for public and private entities
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4.2 Safety Performance vs. Safety Incentives
Safety incentives are utilized on construction projects for the obvious
reason of curbing accidents. The construction process is inherently dangerous,
and given the escalating cost of insurance, reducing the amount of incidents
makes sense. The costs of accidents, already mentioned in this thesis provide
ample reason to endeavor to reduce the accident rate on a project.
Safety incentives are employed by owners with the expectation that a
contractor will take extra time in the proper planning and execution of each
activity. It is also hoped that each individual construction worker will have an
increased awareness concerning safety on the job site. The average RIR and
LWCIR for the construction industry, as reported by OSHA, is 9.8 and 4.3
respectively. As one can discern from Figure 4.9, the average rates from the
owner projects are very low compared to the industry as a whole. CII reports that
CII member companies maintain an impressive average RIR and LWCIR of 2.3
and 0.48 respectively.
The owner projects were analyzed to determine if the use of positive
safety incentives had any impact on the RIR and LWCIR of a project. To test the
null hypothesis, which says that there is no difference (whether or not incentives
were used), the projects were separated into those that employed positive safety
incentives and those projects that did not indicate the use of any safety incentives
at all. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, several projects were eliminated
from consideration due to lack of necessary data.
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Of the remaining 139 projects containing sufficient safety data, 47 utilized
positive incentives, with the remaining 92 projects containing no safety
incentives. The first comparison included projects from all cost categories,
industry groups, and project types. Figure 4.9 shows the mean (average) RIR and
LWCIR for these respective incentive use categories.
The RIR for each group of projects was nearly identical at 3.8 for the
positive incentive group, and 3.9 for the no incentive group. Although additional
research is certainly necessary, this may give the impression that recordable
incidents are bound to happen regardless of incentive use, and may be more
related to a companies long-standing safety procedures and philosophy. At a 95
percent confidence level, these two populations produced a z-value of -.173,
which indicates acceptance of the null hypothesis, essentially meaning that there
is no statistical difference between these two groups.

















Positive (n=47) Incentive TvDe None (n=92)
Figure 4.9: Effect of positive safety incentives on safety performance
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Safety incentive employment did appear however to significantly reduce
the LWCIR on a project. The 47 projects that employed safety incentives had a
mean LWCIR of .5, compared to .9 for those projects with no safety incentives.
Given the cost of a lost workday case, and the consequent effects on morale and
productivity, this appears to be a significant result. Statistical analysis yielded
acceptance of the null hypothesis, however, at 95 percent confidence with a z-
value of -1.42. If the confidence level is reduced to 80 percent, the Null
hypothesis could be rejected, indicating that these two groups are not the same.
Although it is desired to have a confidence level of 90 percent or greater, one
cannot ignore the significance of these results.
In order to further analyze the impacts of safety incentives, the projects
were divided into two categories. The projects were split into those having
greater than 250,000 craft-work-hours (CWH), and those having less than 250K
CWH. This analysis will help determine the effect of safety incentives on
projects of different sizes. The projects were only split into two categories
because of the sample size did not allow for the separation into four categories, in
the manner that CII typically does in most analyses. Figures 4.10 and 4.1 1 show
the results of this analysis for the RIR and LWCIR respectively.
Consistent with the previous analysis, the average RIR was nearly equal
for both groups, with the projects employing safety incentives producing a
slightly lower average RIR. The 19 incentive based projects having less than
250K CWH produced an average RIR of 3.6. The 67 non-incentive based
projects having less than 250K CWH produced an average RIR of 3.9. Statistical
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analysis of these two groups indicates that they are essentially the same at any
significant confidence level.
Safety Performance vs Incentives
Respondent: Owner Location: US/C
Cost Categories: All Industry Group: All
Project Type: All Project Nature: All
4.1
B Positive
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Figure 4.10: Effect of safety incentives on the RIR (CWH dependent)
The average RIR for the 28 incentive based projects containing more than
250K CWH was 3.9, compared to a 4.1 for the 25 non-incentive based projects
over 250K CWH. Statistical analysis provided for acceptance of the null
hypothesis for these two groups as well. Safety incentive use did not seem to
have an impact on the RIR of these projects.
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Figure 4.11: Effect of safety incentives on the LWCIR (CWH dependent)
The comparison of the LWCIR proved to be more interesting. The
projects below 250K CWH provided an essentially equal comparison, however
those projects with more than 250K CWH proved to differ significantly in their
corresponding LWCIR. Figure 4.1 1 first compares 19 projects with incentives to
67 projects without incentives (< 250K CWH). The incentive-based projects had
a slightly lower average rate at .4, compared to .6 for the non-incentive based
projects. Statistical analysis showed these two groups to be essentially the same.
The second comparison that included in Figure 4.11 concerns projects
containing more than 250K CWH. The 28 projects with safety incentives
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produced an average LWCIR of .5, while 25 projects containing no safety
incentives had an average LWCIR more than three times that amount at 1.7. Even
at 95% confidence, these two groups are not the same, thus we can reject the null
hypothesis and it can be concluded that safety incentives are effective in reducing
the LWCIR on a project, especially on larger projects.
These analyses indicate that safety incentives may help one realize a
significant reduction in project accidents, at least lost workday cases. Although it
is not clearly evident that safety incentives reduce the RIR on a project, the fact
that they can reduce the LWCIR is significant, and could have a larger impact on
any project as a whole. Positive incentives will encourage contractors to plan
better for safe work practices and to instill more awareness in their crews. The
consequent effects of this will likely apply to major items of work. Even without
a reduction in the RIR, the fact that the LWCIR can be reduced with incentives
gives ample reason alone for their employment.
4.3 Cost Incentives vs. Cost Growth
The next research question that will be discussed is whether positive cost
incentives actually lower cost growth. After screening the database for the
appropriate cost growth information, 161 projects remained for analysis. Of these
projects, 39 employed the use of positive cost incentives or a combination of
positive and negative. Figure 4.12 shows that these projects had an average cost
growth of only 2.7 percent. The remaining 122 projects that did not employ any
cost incentives experienced an average cost growth of 4.7 percent, 2 percent
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higher than the group utilizing cost incentives. These projects were from every













Cost Growth vs Incentives
Respondent: Owner Location: US/C
Cost Categories: All Industry Group: All
Project Typr: All Proiecl Na,ure: *"
Cost Growth
|
Positive/Combined (n=39) None (n=122)
Type of Incentive
Figure 4.12: Effect of cost incentives on cost growth
Statistical analysis, however, indicated that these two groups of data were
essentially the same in terms of cost growth, even though the non-incentive group
had an average cost growth more than twice that of the incentive group.
Certainly additional data is needed to accurately quantify the effects of
cost incentives on cost growth. One needs to also take into account for any
changes, both owner requested and from other reasons. The reimbursement type
of a project, whether it is lump sum or cost-reimbursable, also likely has a
significant impact on the impact of any cost incentive employed.
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4.4 Schedule Incentives vs. Schedule Growth
The next analysis was a test on whether or not positive schedule incentives
(or combination positive/negative) contributed to a reduction in schedule growth.
As shown in Figure 4.13, these projects were compared with those projects
utilizing only negative incentives or no schedule incentives at all. One-hundred
fifty-nine projects remained for analysis after the data were screened for the
appropriate schedule growth information. A total of 44 projects employed either
positive or a combination of positive & negative schedule incentives. This group
of projects produced an average cost growth of 5.08 percent. The 1 15 remaining
projects that did not employ schedule incentives, or did so only in a negative
fashion, experienced an average schedule growth of 9.32 percent, almost double
that of the former.




















Positive/Combined (n=44) None/Negative only (n=1 1 5)
Type of Incentive
Figure 4. 13:Effect of schedule incentives on schedule growth
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The standard deviations in both groups were fairly large and statistical
analysis of the results yielded a z-value of -.934, well within the acceptance range
of the null hypothesis. These two samples therefore, are considered the same in
terms of schedule growth.
This report also endeavored to determine if the use of only negative
schedule incentives was counterproductive to schedule growth. Unfortunately
only seven projects were available that employed only negative schedule
incentives. These seven projects were compared with the remainder of the 159
projects considered in the previous analysis. This comparison is shown in Figure
4.14.
Schedule Growth vs Incentives
Respondent: Owner Location: US/C
Cost Categories: All Industry Group: All

















Negative Only (n=7) Pos/Both/None (n=152)
Type of Incentive
Figure 4.14: Effect of negative schedule incentives on schedule growth
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"Negative only" schedule incentives produced a whopping average
schedule growth of 27 percent in this small group of projects. Although this small
sample is not considered statistically reliable, it is nonetheless interesting and
should spark interest for further analysis. The remaining projects, totaling 152
when combined, had an average schedule growth of 7 percent. Statistical analysis
yielded a z-value of -1.82, which although in the range of null-hypothesis-
acceptance at 95 percent confidence, falls outside this range when the confidence
value is reduced to 90 percent, indicating that these two groups can be considered
different in terms of schedule growth at 90 percent confidence.
Since this comparison involved a small number of projects utilizing a
"negative-only" incentive approach, the t-statistic was also calculated. The t-
value calculated, .208, indicated an acceptance of the null hypothesis at almost
any level of significance, however, giving further indication that the two sample
populations are essentially the same in terms of schedule growth. Additional
"negative only" projects should be analyzed so that the impact of "negative only"
schedule incentives can be confidently ascertained. This information should
prove valuable to most public contracting entities, since most public contracts
contain a "liquidated damages" clause without any provisions for additional
contractor compensation in the case of on-time or early completion.
4.5 Analysis Summary
The following tables contain a summary of the results and the statistical
analysis done for each comparison made thus far.
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Table: 4.3: Summary of safety analysis (>250K cwh)
Safety Analysis
(cont'd)



























Table 4.4: Summary of cost growth analysis



















Table 4.5: Summary of schedule growth analysis



















Table 4.6: Summary of schedule growth analysis (negative-only incentives)
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4.6 Incentive Use Index vs. Project Performance
The incentive use index developed for purposes of this research also
provided interesting results. As previously discussed, this index is simply the
total number of incentives employed during the construction phase for a particular
project. If a positive cost incentive is used, the incentive use index would equal
one. If both a positive and negative cost incentive is used, the incentive use index
is equal to two. The range for this research is from zero to six, since only three
incentive type were evaluated (safety, cost, and schedule). This idea was
developed in order to determine whether a higher index produces better or worse
project performance in terms of safety, cost, and schedule. Projects that have an
index between zero and one will be compared to projects with an index between
two and six
4.6.1 Safety Performance
A total of 138 projects were available to make the analysis on safety
performance. Figure 4.15 shows that both the average RIR and LWCIR were
similar in each group. There were 46 projects indicating an incentive use index of
greater than two, and these projects experienced an average RIR of 4. 1 and an
average LWCIR of 0.7. The projects with an index less than two, 92 in all,
experienced slightly better performance with an average RIR of 3.8 and an
average LWCIR of 0.5.
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Figure 4.15: Incentive use index vs. overall safety performance
These results are interesting and could suggest that too many incentives
employed, especially if geared towards cost and schedule performance, could be
detrimental to the overall safety performance of a project. The trend shown for
this sample indicates that when too many incentives are employed, contractors
may lose their focus on safety, however, statistical analysis indicates that these




After screening the data, 148 projects were left to conduct the same
analysis on cost growth, shown in Figure 4.16. A total of 44 projects had an
incentive use index greater than 2, while the remaining 104 projects had an index
less than 2. The 44 projects in the higher use range produced an impressive
overall average cost growth of -2.0 percent. The group of projects with a lower
use index experienced an average cost growth of 4 percent, for a total difference
of 6% between the two groups. Given the average cost of the projects in the data,
this amounts to a significant amount of money.
Quantitatively speaking, these results are significant. On a hypothetical
project worth $50 million, analysis of this sample indicates that higher incentive
use correlates to six percent savings, or $3 million.
Statistical analysis yielded a z-value of 1.86, which although means
acceptance of the Null hypothesis at 95 percent confidence (just barely), at 90
percent confidence, the Null hypothesis may be rejected and it may be concluded
that these two groups are different when it comes to cost growth. If it can be
confidently shown that safety performance does not suffer as a result of greater
incentive use, the fact that one is more likely to achieve reduced cost growth if a































Figure 4.16: Incentive use index vs. project performance
4.6.3 Schedule Growth
The analysis of the impact of the incentive use index on schedule
performance produced results consistent with that of the cost growth analysis, and
is also shown in Figure 4.16. The group of projects with an index greater than
two, 47 in all, indicated an average schedule growth of 4 percent. This number is
much lower than the 1 1 percent average schedule growth reported by the projects
with an index of less than two ( 109 in all).
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Assuming a project is worth $50 million, with a 24 month duration and an
assumed 18 percent return on investment (ROI); analysis of this sample indicates
a seven percent schedule growth reduction, 1.7 months in all. Combine that with
1.5% (ROI) per month times $50 million, and this results in a savings of $1.25
million from the schedule savings.
Statistical analysis of this comparison yielded a z-value of 1.78, which
again, at 95 percent confidence, means acceptance of the null hypothesis. At 90
percent confidence, however, the null hypothesis may be rejected and it may be
said that a higher incentive use index appears to produce lower schedule growth
on a project. Similar to the cost growth analysis, as long as it can be shown that
safety performance does not suffer as a result of increased incentive use, it seems
that incentive packages can reduce not only cost, but the schedule as well.
4.6.4 Summary of Incentive Use Index research




Table 4.7: Summary of Incentive Use Index vs. safety performance
Use Index Performance
























Table 4.8: Summary of Incentive Use Index vs. cost growth









































Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
This thesis has shown that certain contract incentives, employed by
owners to encourage a contractor to help the owner reach their goals and
objectives, are effective, while the employment of others has shown to be, at best,
marginally effective for the sample studied. The following paragraphs offer
conclusions reached from the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 as well as
recommendations for procurement agencies (included at the end of this chapter).
Please note that these conclusions are valid for this sample only, but do shed light
on a subject that has had little empirical study.
Public entities seem to shy away from the use of incentives, especially
when compared to private entities. This is evident when one looks at the average
use of cost and safety incentives. Just over 1 1 percent of public projects in the
sample reported the use of cost incentives, and even less, 8.6 percent reported the
use of safety incentives. There are many explanations for these low usage rates,
none more obvious than the fact that public entities are usually constrained by
laws dictating the acceptance of the dreaded "low bid." In this type of
procurement method, the contractor bears the majority of risk, thus public entities
may not realize any benefits from the use of these incentives anyway. If perhaps
the remuneration type were different cost reimbursable for instance, then these
types of incentives would be a more feasible option.
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In contrast, private contracts in the sample reported much higher incentive
use rates at approximately 30 percent for each of the incentive types studied.
Private firms are at greater liberty to determine their procurement strategy, and
are likely benefiting.
Of no surprise was the fact that public entities did employ a significant
amount of schedule incentives. Over 48 percent of the public projects submitted
reported the use of schedule incentives, albeit 11 of the 16 reporting them utilized
negative-only incentives. The preponderance of liquidated damages clauses in
public contracts, with no commensurate reward for early completion, seems to be
counterproductive. Private owners apparently have recognized this, since only
three of the 47 private projects in the sample reporting a schedule incentive used a
"negative-only" approach.
Incentive use among the various industry types was fairly evenly
dispersed, with heavy industrial projects showing a 40 percent usage rate for cost,
schedule, and safety incentives respectively. The use rate among each nature of
project (add-on, grass roots, and modernization) was also fairly even at
approximately 30 percent for each incentive type. The only project type that
really showed any difference was grass roots projects, where over 41 percent
reported the use of schedule incentives versus 30 percent for the other two types
of projects. Incentive use was again shown to be more prevalent in private
projects when the average Incentive Use Index was calculated for both private and
public projects. Private entities had a 33 percent higher average use index at 1.2,
versus the 0.8 calculated for the public projects. As the analysis in Chapter 4
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indicates, private entities are benefiting, especially in the areas of reduced
schedule growth and reduced cost growth.
The use of safety incentives in the sample was shown to improve project
safety performance. Positive safety incentives employed on projects containing
over 250,000 craft-work-hours have resulted in a drastic reduction in the average
LWCIR. This reduction in the LWCIR is also evident on projects of all sizes,
albeit at a lower confidence. Owners cannot ignore these results considering both
the economic and humanitarian benefit of improved safety.
Positive/combined cost incentives in this sample did show a trend towards
reduced cost growth, however, adequate statistical significance could not be
attained. It is likely that with additional research the statistical criteria could be
satisfied. Given the potential savings to owner entities and the seemingly high
use rate of positive cost incentives, certainly more research is needed in this area.
If it cannot be proven that they reduce cost, why employ them in the first place?
The use of positive/combined schedule incentives in this sample did
indicate a lower potential for schedule growth. Similarly, negative-only
incentives did seem to hinder project schedule performance, with the projects
employing them in this sample showing an average schedule growth almost four
times that of those projects with no schedule incentives or positive/combined
schedule incentives. Although only a small number of projects reported the use of
negative incentives, these results are startling nonetheless, especially to the public
sector which often includes a liquidated damages clause in a contract without
much thought. Similar to cost incentives, however, the analysis of schedule
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incentives did not pass the rigorous statistical testing, and further analysis with
more data is needed to confirm these apparent trends.
The incentive use index analysis yielded some interesting results. While
an increased amount of incentives did not necessarily improve safety performance
(nor did it adversely affect it), utilizing 2 or more incentives on a project resulted
in drastic reductions in both cost growth as well as schedule growth.
5.2 Recommendations
Based on the analysis of this sample, the following recommendations are
offered to any entity engaged in the procurement of construction related services:
• Utilize safety incentives to the maximum extent. The benefits
of a lower LWCIR are invaluable;
• Avoid the use of "negative-only" schedule incentives,
particularly liquidated damages clauses. These clauses
immediately create an adversarial relationship between the
owner and contractor and are counterproductive to reducing the
project duration;
• If incentives are desired, utilize a "packaged" approach. By
using 2 or more incentives, the chances are increased that the




• Do not blindly include incentives in any contract. Owner
entities should become educated on incentive use and realize
that incentives should be designed to reward contractors for
desired behavior, not to reward the assumption of additional
risk.
• Additional research should be conducted on the impact of
incentive use when larger samples become available.
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Appendix A: Analysis Data
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pincanj aeteorvs actionJ Scd Grffi
12/22/94 10/15/93 3/15/95 0.15
7/7/95 6/1/94 3/15/95 -0.23
9/9/09 9/9/09 9/9/09 #DIV/0!
9/9/09 9/9/09 9/9/09 #DIV/0!
9/9/09 9/9/09 9/9/09 #DIV/0!
9/9/09 11/1/92 3/30/94 #DIV/0!
9/9/09 8/1/94 6/1/95 #DIV/0!
7/15/95 1/15/95 8/30/95 0.25
2/18/94 3/1/93 6/1/94 0.29
1/15/95 3/15/94 5/1/95 0.18
5/1/94 6/15/92 5/19/94 -0.04
12/31/95 8/19/94 12/15/95 -0.07
9/1 5/93 10/21/91 4/29/94 0.26
12/22/94 10/3/94 12/12/94 -0.26
5/1 5/95 6/1 5/94 3/15/95 -0.14
4/1 5/95 3/1 5/94 6/15/95 0.25
1/15/96 3/1 5/95 2/15/96 0.10
2/15/95 3/15/94 2/15/95 0.00
11/15/93 2/15/93 9/15/93 -0.37
4/15/95 7/1 5/93 1/15/95 -0.14
10/9/95 1/20/93 10/18/95 0.01
11/26/91 8/13/90 4/13/92 0.22
1/1/95 7/19/93 2/1 7/95 0.07
9/9/09 4/1 5/92 3/15/94 #DIV/0!
7/1/94 8/18/92 2/29/96 0.77
4/1/94 6/22/92 5/30/95 0.53
10/1/91 6/15/91 12/15/92 0.39
9/9/09 2/1/90 12/1/93 #DIV/0!
11/20/94 11/15/93 4/14/95 0.23
11/30/95 9/1/94 11/30/95 -0.12
11/6/95 7/5/95 12/15/95 0.26
12/28/95 10/2/93 4/1/96 -0.08
4/1/96 4/1 7/95 7/1/96 0.02
9/9/09 11/9/92 7/5/95 #DIV/0!
6/30/95 9/12/94 7/26/95 0.09
8/27/93 9/9/09 9/9/09 -1.00
9/9/09 7/22/93 9/7/95 #DIV/0!
4/30/96 7/23/93 4/22/96 -0.01
10/15/95 11/15/93 1/15/96 0.24
4/14/94 4/16/91 2/1/96 0.52
10/15/95 7/26/95 9/9/09 -357.43
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ciijdj* version type- char pub^nfv ciijsntr cnsttype cost &1C
...•«+..
. .V.-.W.V.-
048 Version ' I Natural Ga Grass Roo Private LS 1
049 Version ' I Electrical (< Grass Roo Private 100 LS 4
05 Version ' I Hospital Grass Roo Public LS 4
050 Version ' I Natural Ga Add-on Private LS 4
051 Version ' I Natural Ga Grass Roo Private LS 4
052 Version ' I Environme Grass Roo Private GP 4
053 Version ' I Chemical ^ Modemizal Private LS 4
054 Version ' 1 Chemical ^ Add-on Private CR 4
055 Version ' 1 Chemical T Add-on Private LS 4
056 Version ' 1 Chemical f* Add-on Private LS 4
057 Version ' 1 Chemical ^ Add-on Private LS 4
058 Version ' 1 Warehouse Add-on Private LS 4
059 Version ' 1 Water/Was Add-on Private LS 4
060 Version ' 1 Maintenani Grass Roo Private LS 4
061 Version ' 1 Water/Was Modemizal Private LS 4
062 Version ' 1 Consumer Grass Roo Private GP 4
063 Version ' 1 Consumer Add-on Private CR 4
064 Version ' 1 Consumer Modemizal Private 15 CR 4
065 Version ' 1 Warehouse Modemizal Private 75 CR 4
066 Version ' 1 Consumer Add-on Private 100 CR 4
068 Version ' 1 Electrical ("Grass Roo Private 27 LS 4
069 Version ' 1 Oil Refinin< Add-on Private 100 CR 4
O70 Version ' 1 Chemical 1^ Grass Roo Private 100 GP 3
071 Version ' 1 Oil Refininc Modemizal Private CR 1
072 Version " 1 Oil Refininc Add-on Private 100 CR 4
073 Version ' 1 Oil Refinin< Grass Roo Private 100 CR 4
074 Version 1 Oil Refininc Modemizal Private 100 CR 4
075 Version " 1 Oil Refininc Grass Roo Private 100 CR 1
076 Version ' 1 Oil Refininc Grass Roo Private 100 CR 1
077 Version 1 Chemical h Grass Roo Private CR 1
078 Version 1 Environme Modemizal Private LS 4
079 Version 1 Pulp and P Modemizal Private CR 4
08 Version 1 Electrical (< Add-on Private 95 I 4
080 Version 1 Pulp and P Modemizal Private LS 4
081 Version 1 Pulp and P Add-on Private 75 CR 4
082 Version 1 Chemical 1 Add-on Private 100 CR 3
083 Version 1 Laboratory Grass Roo Private CR 4
084 Version 1 Laboratory Grass Roo Private CR 4
085 Version 1 Lowrise Of Grass Roo Private 100 CR 4
086 Version 1 Electrical (' Modemizal Public 30 CR 4
087 Version 1 Water/Was Modemizal Public LS 4
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schdjERG safe.jnc inc trtdx ciffwIJir feettSr^ Istakdc vlftBillf LVYCJR
2 4
2 30791
3 4 2 373661 16 43 8.563912 23.01551
2 4 1 132815 2 2 3.011708 3.011708
4 1 1 -999 -999 -999 200000 200000
4 1 1 -999 -999 -999 200000 200000
4 4 216113 4 1 3.701767 0.925442
4 4 101000
4 1 1 69451 2 5.759456
1 1 2 54190
4 4 101044 1 1 .979336
4 4 1 53590 3 1 3.906504 1.302168
4 4 51720
4 4 82000 3 7.31 7073
4 4 101357 2 3.946447
4 4 245000 2 1 .632653
4 4 468508 9 1 3.841983 0.426887
4 4 106400
4 4 1 55862 1 1 1.283186 1.283186
4 4 205000 1 0.97561
4 4 404593 1 0.494324
4 1 548000 18 2 6.569343 0.729927
4 1 111398 2 3.590729
3 5 5000000 98 3 3.92 0.12
1 3 541269 -999 -999 -369.133 -369.133
1 2 240000 4 3.333333
4 4 298000 5 1 3.355705 0.671141
1 2 67560 1 2.960332
1 3 2784268 32 1 2.298629 0.071832
1 3 1093820 13 1 2.376991 0.182845
1 3 914000 8 1 .750547
4 4 87328
4 4 320000 6 3.75
4 4 148000 4 5.405405
4 4 160000 8 1 10 1.25
4 4 148414 10 1 13.47582 1 .347582
3 3 6 367532 5 2 2.720852 1 .088341
4 4 128000
4 4 300000 16 4 10.66667 2.666667
4 4 1067000 22 9 4.123711 1 .686973
4 4 84680 2 4.723666





































































































































































































































































































p&icoftJ aetconms acteonJ Scd Grtti
10/15/95 7/29/95 11/19/95 -0.02
10/1/92 4/9/92 2/5/93 -0.24
9/9/09 11/8/93 8/10/95 #DIV/0!
10/3/94 2/28/94 12/19/94 0.35
9/26/94 4/25/94 10/3/94 0.05
10/30/92 11/1/90 4/1/93 0.71
12/5/95 3/1/95 1/12/96 0.14
11/15/95 5/1/95 11/27/95 0.06
9/1/95 9/7/94 1/1/96 0.34
2/1 5/96 3/26/95 1/19/96 -0.07
8/4/95 10/3/94 11/30/95 0.39
11/1/93 1/1/93 11/20/93 -0.11
8/1/95 8/1/94 8/15/95 0.04
8/4/94 5/24/93 1/31/94 -0.41
9/1/95 5/1/94 2/26/96 0.04
1/1/95 8/1 5/93 2/1/95 0.06
8/31/95 11/1/94 9/7/95 0.02
6/15/95 3/1/94 6/1/95 -0.03
2/1/96 8/1/94 6/1/96 0.22
11/20/95 4/3/95 2/12/96 0.22
1/31/96 10/1/94 5/15/96 0.34
12/29/95 7/5/95 12/15/95 -0.49
3/15/94 10/15/92 7/1 5/94 0.11
10/20/95 3/1/95 11/14/95 0.11
10/1/94 5/1/93 10/1/94 0.00
10/31/95 6/1/94 10/1/95 0.07
5/1/95 4/1/94 6/1/95 0.40
6/1/95 5/3/93 4/17/95 -0.06
6/1/95 5/1/93 3/24/95 -0.09
4/1/95 6/1/93 2/27/95 -0.09
5/2/95 6/8/94 5/4/95 0.01
6/30/95 3/1/95 9/30/95 0.43
6/15/95 7/1 5/93 12/15/95 0.07
6/1 5/95 5/31/94 10/15/95 0.32
9/9/09 2/1/95 7/1 5/95 #DIV/0!
10/15/95 4/1 5/94 7/15/95 -0.25
3/30/95 8/1/93 2/28/95 -0.05
6/30/93 8/15/91 12/30/93 0.27
12/31/94 1/1/90 10/31/94 -0.03
1/19/96 10/10/95 1/17/96 -0.02






-;^1; ::;; char pubfpriv
Electrical (< Modemizal Public
cir cntr ^srtype : ::.6oftesJsl:; ! : ; ; !!
088 100 CR 4
089 Version 1 Electrical (1 Modemizal Public 100 CR 4
090 Version 1 Electrical (1 Modemizal Public 100 CR 4
091 Version 1 Oil Refinin< Add-on Private OCR 4
092 Version 1 Chemical I Add-on Private 100 CR 4
093 Version 1 Chemical f* Add-on Private 100 CR 4
094 Version 1 Chemical ^ Grass Roo Private 100 CR 4
095 Version 1 Chemical ^ Modemizal Private 70 CR 4
096 Version 1 WaterA/Vas Grass Roo Private 100 CR 4
097 Version 1 Chemical I Grass Roo Private 100 CR
098 Version 1 Lowrise Of Grass Roo Private GP
099 Version 1 Microelectr Grass Roo Private OCR
01 03 Version 2 WaterA/Vas Modemizal Private LS
01 04 Version 2 Laboratory Grass Roo Private GP
O105 Version 2 Oil Refininc Modemizal Private CR
01 06 Version 2 Marine Fac Add-on Private 100 CR
O107 Version 2 Oil Refininc Modemizal Private CR
01 08 Version 2 Environme Grass Roo Private 100 CR
01 09 Version 2 Oil Refininc Add-on Private 70 CR 4
O110 Version 2 Metals Ref Grass Roo Private CR 1
0111 Version 2 Metals Ref Modemizal Private OCR 3
0112 Version 2 Metals Ref Modemizal Private LS 4
0113 Version 2 Metals Ref Modemizal Private 100 CR 4
0114 Version 2 Chemical h Add-on Private 100 LS 4
01 15 Version 2 Chemical h Grass Roo Private 100 CR 1
0116 Version 2 Chemical h Grass Roo Private LS 4
0117 Version 2 Chemical 1* Modemizal Private CR 3
0119 Version 2 Maintenant Grass Roo Public LS 4
O120 Version 2 Lowrise Of Grass Roo Public LS 4
0121 Version 2 Lowrise Of Grass Roo Public LS 4
0122 Version 2 Pharmacei Modemizal Private 60 GP 1
01 23 Version 2 Pharmacei Modemizal Private GP 3
01 24 Version 2 Pharmacei Grass Roo Private LS 4
0125 Version 2 Pharmacei Modemizal Private 100 CR 3
01 26 Version 2 Pharmacei Modemizal Private LS 4
01 27 Version 2 Chemical f* Add-on Private OCR 4
0128 Version 2 Pharmacei Grass Roo Private LS 4
0129 Version 2 Electrical (1 Add-on Public 100 CR 1
01 30 Version 2 Electrical (1 Add-on Public 100 CR 1
0131 Version 2 Electrical (< Modemizal Public LS 4
01 32 Version 2 Electrical (< Modemizal Public 100 CR 1
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3 1 3 604900 8 2.645065
4 4 60000 1 1 3.333333 3.333333
4 4 1 59968 3 3.75075
4 4 96344 1 2.075895
4 4 67066
4 4 320000 6 3.75
4 4 -999 -999 -999 200000 200000
4 4 1 640300 6 1.874122
1 1 3 587000 6 2.044293
1 1 3 3595212 103 9 5.729843 0.500666
1 1 3 188016 2 -999 2.127479 -1062.68
1 1 3 102100 1 1 .958864
1 1 3 276710 3 2.168335
1 1 3 51000 1 3.921569
1 1 3 318000 1 0.628931
1 1 3 1850000 12 3 1 .297297 0.324324
4 4 43000
1 1 3 133292 7 1 10.50326 1.500465
3 3 6 579190 32 2 11.04991 0.69062
4 4 174349 14 1 16.05974 1.147124
4 4 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
1 1 2 88400 1 1 2.262443 2.262443
1 1 3 550000 4 1 .454545
4 4 455000 3 1 1.318681 0.43956
4 3 4 196000
2 4 1 40000
2 4 1 60000 1 1 3.333333 3.333333
2 4 1 72254
1 1 3 47000 1 4.255319
3 3 6 120000 1 1 .666667
4 4 1110000 57 6 10.27027 1.081081
3 3 6 900000 34 4 7.555556 0.888889
4 1 1 1000000 63 9 12.6 1.8
4 4 100000
3 4 2 250000 2 1.6
1 1 3 542260 8 1 2.950614 0.368827
1 4 2 29560 1 1 6.7659 6.7659
4 4 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
1 4 2 49108 2 8.145312
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w---i&S ell id c prbudgat
:
pidjbost budescon aclcsodrt Cost Grth plrtcotvs
2 O88 6945000 7274000 2869000 3180000 0.1084 4/22/95
2 089 4928000 5127000 1685000 1864000 0.106231 5/7/94
1 090 65685000 65674000 40964000 37300000 -0.08944 10/1/93
2 091 10100000 9300000 3278000 2818000 -0.14033 10/1/95
1 092 8000000 9840000 1731400 3551000 1 .050941 5/3/93
2 093 10888000 11511000 5116000 5943000 0.16165 3/13/95
1 094 9200000 8614000 2144000 1922000 -0.10354 5/1/95
2 095 30000000 32700000 4700000 8000000 0.702128 1/24/95
1 096 7200000 6650000 1283000 1 789000 0.394388 2/15/95
1 097 70000000 70000000 -999 -999 9/1/92
1 098 58700000 54900000 -999 -999 9/9/09
1 099 5.15E+08 5.15E+08 -999 -999 9/9/09
1 0103 23100000 22500000 11480000 12665000 0.103223 2/13/95
2 0104 9600000 941 7000 8493000 8069000 -0.04992 5/1 5/95
1 0105 44700000 36000000 26049000 20489000 -0.21344 2/10/96
1 0106 7000000 6500000 5125000 4846000 -0.05444 9/15/95
1 0107 29000000 29200000 18630000 20289000 0.08905 10/1/95
1 0108 1 .48E+08 1 .45E+08 94491000 941 54000 -0.00357 11/1/93
1 0109 6700000 5800000 3540000 3100000 -0.12429 6/29/96
1 0110 20500000 22400000 6391937 7360572 0.15154 3/1 5/95
1 0111 64800000 66230000 28640000 29229000 0.020566 3/3/95
2 0112 77600000 75005000 27605000 24630000 -0.10777 6/1/92
2 0113 37400000 46204000 14926000 22000000 0.473938 12/1/92
2 0114 18287000 17882000 7353000 8207000 0.116143 10/1/94
1 0115 81800000 66400000 37500000 30100000 -0.19733 2/1/96
1 0116 24900000 32819000 12718000 16898000 0.328668 3/1/95
1 0117 17750000 14900000 9900000 8150000 -0.17677 11/15/95
2 0119 4060000 6282000 4800000 6022000 0.254583 2/1 5/90
2 0120 9000000 841 5000 9000000 8415000 -0.065 9/9/09
2 0121 7200000 6955400 -888 -888 8/8/08
2 0122 6475000 6475000 2600000 3100000 0.192308 3/8/96
1 0123 7000000 6500000 5575000 5210000 -0.06547 4/1 5/96
1 0124 1 .29E+08 1 .33E+08 74231000 79808000 0.07513 7/1/92
2 0125 53500000 54900000 46400000 47400000 0.021552 12/1/94
1 0126 1 .67E+08 1 .61 E+08 95000000 90000000 -0.05263 1/1/93
2 0127 14550000 1 5399000 7435000 7854000 0.056355 4/1/95
2 0128 27800000 28600000 24500000 24100000 -0.01633 8/1/95
2 0129 54000000 59300000 36354000 46975000 0.292155 5/23/94
2 0130 5640000 5891000 2301000 2413000 0.048674 10/7/94
2 0131 50982000 56238000 9387000 14890000 0.586236 2/1/94
2 0132 7066000 6671 000 2941000 2740000 -0.06834 2/10/96
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ncory actcorts actconj SedGrth
6/6/95 4/22/95 6/6/95 0.00
7/1/94 5/7/94 7/1/94 0.00
5/30/96 2/1/94 6/30/96 -0.09
4/29/96 10/1/95 4/29/96 0.00
7/1/94 5/3/93 7/11/94 0.02
12/15/95 3/20/95 4/12/96 0.40
12/21/95 5/15/95 12/31/95 -0.02
12/28/95 12/19/94 2/9/96 0.23
12/29/95 4/10/95 3/28/96 0.11
12/31/93 9/1/92 12/31/93 0.00
9/9/09 9/9/09 9/9/09 #DIV/0!
9/9/09 9/9/09 9/9/09 #DIV/0!
2/29/96 1/27/95 6/22/96 0.34
7/30/96 5/1/95 7/30/96 0.03
7/23/96 2/10/96 9/1/96 0.24
8/6/96 9/15/95 1/31/97 0.55
4/17/96 10/1/95 4/17/96 0.00
3/1/94 11/1/93 4/1/94 0.26
12/19/96 6/19/96 1/23/97 0.26
3/1 5/96 11/15/94 8/11/95 -0.27
3/31/97. 3/13/95 9/23/96 -0.26
2/16/94 6/1/92 2/16/94 0.00
2/1/94 9/1/93 5/1/94 -0.43
11/30/95 10/1/94 11/30/95 0.00
3/1/97 1/15/96 2/15/97 0.01
3/30/96 5/1/95 5/30/96 0.00
8/15/96 12/15/95 8/1 5/96 -0.11
4/15/91 7/30/90 11/22/91 0.13
9/9/09 9/9/09 9/9/09 #DIV/0!
8/8/08 9/30/91 11/4/92 #DIV/0!
9/19/96 3/15/96 8/31/96 -0.13
10/15/96 4/15/96 9/1 5/96 -0.16
10/1/95 7/1/92 4/30/96 0.18
7/1/96 12/1/94 9/1/96 0.11
8/1/94 1/1/93 2/1/96 0.95
4/1/96 2/1/95 1/1/96 -0.09
2/28/96 8/1/95 4/25/96 0.27
9/30/95 9/23/94 12/14/95 -0.10
9/30/96 10/7/94 11/24/95 -0.43
4/30/94 10/29/94 3/12/95 0.52




01 33 Version 2
01 34 Version 2
0135 Version 2
01 36 Version 2
01 37 Version 2
01 38 Version 2
01 39 Version 2
01 40 Version 2
0141 Version 2








01 50 Version 2
01 51 Version 2
01 52 Version 2
01 53 Version 2
01 54 Version 2
01 55 Version 2




01 60 Version 2
0161 Version 2
0162 Version 2
01 63 Version 2
0164 Version 2
01 66 Version 2
01 67 Version 2
01 68 Version 2
01 69 Version 2
0171 Version 2
0172 Version 2
01 73 Version 2
0174 Version 2
01 75 Version 2
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safejnc Inclmix crffwfciir mcrtSri istwfcdc .'.««. LWCJR
4 4 297437 3 3 2.01 7234 2.017234
4 4 -888 1 1 -225.225 -225.225
4 4 375700 2 1 .064679
4 4 521000
4 4 112000
4 4 33110 -888 -888 -5363.94 -5363.94
4 4 500000 2 0.8
4 4 194000
4 4 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
4 4 50000
1 1 3 500000 2 0.8
4 4 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
2 4 1 -888
1 1 3 2783000 14 1.006109
3 2 5 870000 12 2 2.758621 0.45977
1 2 3 336000
3 3 5 30000
3 3 6 73123
4 4 80713
4 4 27649 2 14.46707
4 4 103100 1 1 .939864
4 4 24043 1 8.318429




4 4 936093 23 2 4.914042 0.427308
4 4 34980





4 4 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
1 1 3 96000 2 4.166667
4 4 1 617300 13 4.21189
4 4 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
3 1 5 -999 -999 -999 200000 200000
4 1 1 -888 -888 -888 200000 200000
4 1 1 3348553 29 4 1 .732091 0.238909
4 4 81415 2 4.9131
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<u& eiJJdj; prbudgat ;projcost 1budcseon actcscon Cos! Grtli ptocorrs
2 61 33 52650000 52900000 16792000 18546000 0.104455 10/1/95
2 0134 19850000 26250000 18000000 22000000 0.222222 12/1/96
2 0135 55600000 55400000 36030000 34280000 -0.04857 10/1/95
1 0136 58800000 57200000 39567620 42375430 0.070962 4/1/94
1 01 37 16066600 10845700 10599600 6078700 -0.42652 2/1/95
2 01 38 3900000 4800000 1091680 2008118 0.839475 8/15/95
7 0139 73000000 67600000 29100000 27400000 -0.05842 8/1/95
2 01 40 21600000 21500000 7400000 7250000 -0.02027 10/1/95
2 0141 11100000 10740000 -888 -888 5/1 7/96
2 01 42 4650000 4812000 1959000 2294000 0.171006 8/8/08
1 0143 67200000 56640000 22200000 17900000 -0.19369 5/1/95
2 01 44 21000000 19482514 9688000 9387000 -0.03107 9/29/88
2 01 45 6360000 6150806 5600000 5553877 -0.00824 3/30/94
1 01 46 2.31 E+08 1 .78E+08 -888 -888 11/1/93
1 01 47 1 .88E+08 1 .87E+08 88854000 98570000 0.109348 2/10/93
1 0148 48800000 43000000 27600000 22400000 -0.18841 3/1/95
2 0149 10976000 10968000 6888000 5436000 -0.2108 6/26/95
2 01 50 5663000 8323000 2126000 4505000 1.119003 3/22/96
2 0151 7500000 7949000 3200000 3549000 0.109063 8/8/08
2 0152 15185000 14000000 4685000 3418000 -0.27044 5/1 5/95
2 0153 1 1 559000 11572000 3548000 3930000 0.107666 10/17/94
2 0154 6000000 5400000 4251 000 3750000 -0.11785 5/24/96
1 01 55 1 .43E+08 1 .44E+08 -888 -888 10/15/95
1 01 56 26250000 23674000 16137000 -888 -1 .00006 3/1/94
1 01 57 22800000 22800000 8536900 8320000 -0.02541 10/28/96
1 01 58 25733000 25733000 10232300 10955723 0.0707 3/9/95
1 01 59 76500000 82404000 34937000 40291000 0.153247 11/30/94
1 01 60 7800000 8700000 2057000 1831000 -0.10987 3/1 5/96
2 0161 79000000 72400000 30900000 34600000 0.119741 11/1/95
1 01 62 6100000 6500000 -888 -888 10/7/96
2 0163 1700000 1550000 727000 592000 -0.18569 4/1/96
1 01 64 9900000 9730000 3998000 4930000 0.233117 5/3/96
2 0166 11750000 12840000 11125000 12007000 0.079281 11/15/95
2 01 67 28620000 25420000 11895000 11805000 -0.00757 1/15/94
2 01 68 17001000 13086000 8100000 5936000 -0.26716 5/1/95
8 0169 1 .25E+08 1 .04E+08 70388000 54497000 -0.22576 9/1/94
8 0171 7844000 -888 3312000 -888 -1 .00027 3/10/97
1 0172 5025000 5300000 -888 -888 1/1/96
8 0173 24000000 26000000 13524000 1 5300000 0.131322 3/1/96
1 0174 1 .73E+08 2.31 E+08 78882000 1.42E+08 0.803238 9/1 5/95
1 0175 7200000 7094000 2192000 2037000 -0.07071 4/19/95
74

pSicory aeteoivs acteonj Scd Grth
5/1/96 11/1/95 7/1/96 0.14
7/1/97 12/1/96 7/1/97 0.00
7/1/97 12/1/95 7/1/97 -0.10
7/1/96 5/1/94 3/15/97 0.28
2/1/96 3/1/95 1/1/96 -0.16
5/15/96 9/1 5/95 5/15/96 -0.11
11/30/96 8/1/95 12/10/96 0.02
9/1/96 10/1/95 9/30/96 0.09
10/25/96 4/29/96 11/15/96 0.24
6/30/96 8/8/08 6/30/96 0.00
4/1/96 3/15/95 4/1/96 0.14
1/10/91 11/9/88 5/9/91 0.09
12/19/95 3/30/94 3/21/96 0.15
10/31/95 11/1/93 8/14/95 -0.11
6/1/94 3/15/93 6/1/94 -0.07
8/1/96 3/1/95 7/13/96 -0.04
8/23/96 6/26/95 8/23/96 0.00
10/7/96 5/1/96 4/18/97 0.77
8/8/08 5/6/96 2/27/97 #DIV/0!
12/15/95 5/15/95 3/15/96 0.43
2/6/96 10/17/94 1/31/96 -0.01
11/4/96 5/24/96 11/4/96 0.00
12/15/96 10/15/95 1/15/97 0.07
6/1/96 2/1/94 1/1/96 -0.15
4/18/97 10/28/96 4/18/97 0.00
4/28/96 3/9/95 4/28/96 0.00
2/1/97 11/30/94 4/1/97 0.07
10/15/96 3/15/96 10/15/96 0.00
1/1/97 11/1/95 1/1/97 0.00
4/11/97 10/7/96 4/11/97 0.00
6/17/96 4/1 5/96 7/22/96 0.27
12/13/96 3/18/96 4/11/97 0.74
12/15/96 10/15/95 4/15/97 0.38
1/6/95 1/15/94 12/7/94 -0.08
12/1/95 5/1 5/95 11/16/95 -0.14
11/1/95 8/30/94 10/31/95 0.00
6/20/97 3/24/97 8/8/08 -318.35
5/1/96 1/1/96 6/30/96 0.50
12/1/96 3/1/96 12/15/96 0.05
12/17/96 9/1 5/95 3/17/97 0.20
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Appendix B: CII Questionnaire (Owner Version 2.0)
The data collected by this form begins the second round of data collection for
CII's benchmarking and metrics system. The data will be used to establish
performance norms, to identify trends, and to correlate execution of project
management processes to project outcomes. It will form part of a permanent
database. Through such correlation across many companies and projects,
opportunities for improving your company's project performance will be
identified. CII will not analyze performance of individual companies, however.
Each company will be provided the means to compare itself to the benchmarks.
Therefore, it is important that you retain a copy of this questionnaire for your
records. Ail data will be held in strict confidence.
When you have completed the questionnaire, please return it to your Company's
Data Liaison by May 1, 1997.
The next 2 pages contain definitions for project phases. Please pay particular
attention to the start and stop points which have been highlighted. All project
costs should be given in U.S. dollars. If you need further assistance in
interpreting the intent of a question, please call Ned Givens or Kirk Morrow of
CII at (512) 471-4319 (E-mail: tkmorrow@mail.utexas.edu). Remember,
conformance to the instructions and phase definitions is crucial for establishing
reliable benchmarks.
Your company data liaison has been provided with a list of projects which were
submitted by your company during the previous data collection effort. In order to
maintain the integrity of the database, please ensure that projects which have been
submitted previously are not reported again.
If the information required to answer a given question is not available, please
write "UNK" (unknown) in the space provided. If the information requested does
not apply to this project, please write "NA" (not applicable) in the space
provided. However, keep in mind that too many "unknowns" or "not applicables"
could render the project unusable for analysis.
This form should be completed under the direction of the project manager. The
project manager should consult with colleagues who worked on the project. We
urge that you carefully review the phase table on the next 2 pages before
attempting to provide the requested information.
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2. Your Project I. D. (You may use any reference
to protect the project's identity. The purpose of this I.D. is to help you and CII
personnel identify the questionnaire correctly if clarification of data is needed
and to prevent duplicate project entries.)




4. Contact Person (name of the person filling out this form):
5. Contact Phone No. ( ) 6. Contact Fax No. £
7. Principal Type of Project (Check only one. If you feel the project does not have a
principal type, but is an even mixture of two or more of those listed, please attach a
short description of the project. If the project type does not appear in the list, please










































8. This project was (check only one): Grass Roots Modernization
Addition
Grass roots - a new facility from the foundations and up. A project
requiring demolition of an existing facility before new construction begins
is also classified as grass roots.
Modernization - a facility for which a substantial amount of the
equipment, structure, or other components is replaced or modified, and
which may expand capacity and/or improve the process or facility.





9. Achieving Design Basis. Please indicate in the following table the product
or function of the completed facility, the unit of measure which best relates
the product or function capacity of the completed facility, the planned
capacity of the facility at the start of detail design, and the capacity achieved
by the completed facility.
For process facilities, the measure is either one of input or output as appropriate.
Examples : crude oil refining unit - barrels per day throughput
For infrastructure or buildings, please include the measure that you feel is best.
Please spell out this measure rather than using an abbreviation.
If the product produced or function provided by this facility is of a confidential
nature, please write "Confidential" in the first column and provide the other data.
If you are unable to furnish a measure or units, please write "NA" (not applicable)



















9a. Please indicate the method of acceptance testing used on this project.
No Assessment
Demonstrated operations at achieved level
Formal documented acceptance test over a meaningful period of time
9b. Please indicate how the achieved capacity of the completed facility compares
against expectations documented in the project execution plan. If the
achieved capacity is much worse or much better than expected, please briefly
comment on the primary cause of the deviation.
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Much better than expected Why?
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10. Project Participants. Please list the companies, including your company,
that helped execute this project, but do not list any subcontractors. Indicate
the function(s) each company performed and the approximate percent of that
function to the nearest 10%. For each function, indicate the principle form of
remuneration in use at the completion of the work. Please indicate if each
participant was an alliance partner and if their contract contained incentives.
Please use the following codes to identify the Function performed by each
project participant.
ppp Pre-Project Planner DM Demolition/Abatem
ent Contractor
PPC Pre-Project Planning Consultant GC General Contractor
D Designer PC Prime Contractor
PE Procurement - Equipment PM Project Manager
PB Procurement - Bulks CM Construction
Manager
Percent of Function refers to the percent of the overall function contributed
by the company listed. Estimate to the nearest 10 percent.
Type of Remuneration refers to the overall method of payment. Unit price
refers to a price for in place units of work and does not refer to hourly
charges for skill categories or time card mark-ups. Hourly rate payment
schedules should be categorized as cost reimbursable. Please use the
following codes to identify remuneration type. Record the form of




An Alliance Partner is a company with whom your company has a long-term
formal strategic agreement that ordinarily covers multiple projects. Circle
"Y" to indicate that a company was an alliance partner or circle "N" if the
company was not an alliance partner.
If Contract Incentives were utilized, please indicate whether those
incentives were positive (a financial incentive for attaining an objective),
88
Lump Sum GP Guarantee<
Maximum
Price
Unit Price I In-house
Cost Reimbursable/Target Price (Including
Incentives)

negative (a financial disincentive for failure to achieve an objective), or both.

































(circle as many as apply)
Cost Schedule Safety Quality
Y N + _ + _ 4 4- _
Y N 4- - + - 4 + -
Y N + - + - 4 4- -
Y N + - + - 4 4- -
Y N + - + - 4 - + -
Y N + - + - 4 - 4- -
Y N 4- - + - 4 - 4- -
Y N + - 4- - 4 - 4- -
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11a. Total Project Bud2et
• The total project budget amount should correspond to the estimate at the start
of detail design including contingency .
• The total project budget amount should include all planned expenses from pre-
project planning through startup or to a "ready for use" condition, excluding the
cost ofland .
• State the project budget in U.S. dollars to the nearest $1000. (You may use a
"k" to indicate thousands in lieu of "...,000".)
lib. How much contingency does this budget contain? (to the nearest $1000. You
may use a "k" to indicate thousands in lieu of ". . .,000".)
$
12. Total Actual Project Cost :
• The total actual project cost should include all actual project costs from pre-
project planning through startup or to a "ready for use" condition, excluding the
cost of land.
• Actual costs should correspond to those that were part of the budget. For
example, if the budget included specific amounts for in-house personnel, then
actual cost should include the actual amounts expended during the project for
their salaries, overhead, travel, etc.
• State the project cost in U.S. dollars to the nearest $1000. (You may use a "k"
to indicate thousands in lieu of "...,000".)
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13. Please indicate the budgeted and actual costs by project phase
Phase budget amounts should correspond to the estimate at the start of
detail design.
Refer to the table on pages 2 and 3 for phase definitions and typical cost
elements.
State the phase costs in U.S. dollars to the nearest $1000. (You may use
a "k" to indicate thousands in lieu of "...,000".)
Include the cost of bulk materials in construction and the cost of
engineered equipment in procurement.
If this project did not involve Demolition/Abatement or Startup please
write "NA" for those phases.
The sum of phase budgets should equal the Total Project Budget and the
sum of actual phase costs should equal Total Actual Project Cost from
questions 1 1 & 12 above.







Pre-Project Planning $ $ $
Detail Design $ $ $
Procurement $ $ $
Demolition/Abatement $ $ $
Construction $ $ $
Startup $ $ $
Totals $ $ $
14. Planned and Actual Project Schedule
• The dates for the planned schedule should be those in effect at the start
of detail design. If you cannot provide an exact day for either the
planned or actual, estimate to the nearest week in the form mm/dd/yy;
for example, 1/8/96, 2/15/96, or 3/22/96.)
• Refer to the chart on pages 2 and 3 for a description of starting and
stopping points for each Phase.
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• If this project did not involve Demolition/Abatement or Startup please
write "NA" for those phases.
Project Phase
Planned Schedule Actual Schedule
Start
mm / dd /
yy
Stop
mm / dd /
yy
Start
mm / dd / yy
Stop
mm / dd / yy
Pre-Project Planning / /
/












14a. What percentage of the total engineering workhours for design were
completed prior to total project budget authorization? (Write "UNK" in the
blank if you don't have this information)
%
14b. What percentage of the total engineering workhours for design were
completed prior to start of the construction phase? (Write "UNK" in the




15. Project Development Changes and Scope Changes. Please record the
changes to your project by phase in the table provided below. For each
phase indicate the total number, the net cost impact, and the net schedule
impact resulting from project development changes and scope changes.
Changes may be initiated by either the owner or contractor.
Project Development Changes include those changes required to execute
the original scope of work or obtain original process basis.
Scope Changes include changes in the base scope of work or process basis.
• Changes should be included in the phase in which they were initiated.
Refer to the table on pages 2 and 3 to help you decide how to classify
the changes by project phase. If you cannot provide the requested
change information by phase, but can provide the information for the
total project please indicate the totals.
• Indicate "minus" (-) in front of cost or schedule values, if the net
changes produced a reduction. If no changes were initiated during a
phase, write "0" in the "Total Number" columns.
• State the cost of changes in U.S. dollars to the nearest $1000 and the
schedule changes to the nearest week. You may use a "k" to indicate


































Design $ $ wks wks
Procur
ement





$ $ wks wks
Constr
uction
$ $ wks wks
Startup $ $ wks wks
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Was there a system for tracking and evaluating field rework for this project?
Yes No
If yes, please complete the following table. If no, proceed to question 17.
Please indicate the Direct Cost of Field Rework, the Cost of Quality Management,
and the Schedule Impact of Field Rework for each category shown in the following
table. If you track field rework by a few other or additional categories, please add
them in the blank spaces provided. If the system used on this project does not
include any of the Sources of Field Rework listed, write "NA" (not applicable) in
the Direct Cost of Field Rework space. If your system used a listed Source of Field
Rework, but this project had no Field Rework attributable to it, write "0" in the
Direct Cost of Field Rework space. If you cannot provide the requested field
rework information by Source of Field Rework, but can provide the information for
the total project, please write "UNK" (unknown) in the fields adjacent to the
sources of field rework and indicate the totals.
The direct cost of field rework relates to all costs needed to perform the rework
itself whereas the cost of quality management includes quality assurance or quality
control costs, which may identify the need to perform field rework or prevent the



































Totals $ $ Weeks
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17. Actual Total Cost of Major Equipment
Please record the actual total cost of major equipment procured for permanent
installation in this project in the space provided below.
• Include only the invoiced cost for items of major equipment. Do not include
the cost of associated services such as making vendor inquiries, analyzing
vendor bids, or expediting.
• State the cost of equipment in U.S. dollars to the nearest $1000. You may use
a "k" to indicate thousands in lieu of "...,000". Refer to the following table to
help you identify major equipment expenditures.
• If the project did not include major equipment, which is typical of many
infrastructure or building projects, please write "NA."
General
Classification
Kinds of Equipment Covered
Columns and Pressure
Vessels (Code Design)
Towers, columns, reactors, unfired pressure vessels, bulk storage spheres,
and unfired kilns; includes internals such as trays and packing.
Tanks (non-code design; 0-
15 psig, MAW or design
pressure)
Atmospheric storage tanks, bins, hoppers, and silos.
Exchangers Heat transfer equipment: tubular exchangers, condensers, evaporators,
reboilers, coolers (including fin-fan coolers and cooling towers) - excludes
fired heaters.
Direct-fired Equipment Fired heaters, furnaces, boilers, kilns, and dryers, including associated
equipment such as super-heaters, air preheaters, burners, stacks, flues, draft
fans and drivers, etc.
Pumps All types of liquid pumps and drivers.
Vacuum Equipment Mechanical vacuum pumps, ejectors, and other vacuum-producing





Major electrical items (e.g., transformers, switch gear, motor-control




Conveyers, cranes, hoists, chutes, feeders, scales and other weighing
devices, packaging machines, and lift trucks.
Package Units Integrated systems bought as a package (e.g., air dryers,





Agitators, crushers, pulverizers, blenders, separators, cyclones, filters,





Place a mark anywhere on the scale below that best describes the level of
complexity for this project as compared to other projects from the same
industry sector. For example, if this is a heavy industrial project, how does
it compare in complexity to other heavy industrial projects. Use the
definitions below the scale as general guidelines.
Low Average High
Complexity Complexity Complexity
• Low Complexity - Characterized by the use of no unproven technology,
small number of process steps, small facility size or process capacity,
previously used facility configuration or geometry, proven construction
methods, etc.
• High Complexity - Characterized by the use of unproven technology, an
unusually large number of process steps, large facility size or process
capacity, new facility configuration or geometry, new construction
methods, etc.
18. Workhours and Accident Data
Please record total craft workhours, the number of recordable injuries, and the
number of lost workday cases separately in the spaces provided below.
• Use the U.S. Department of Labor's OSHA definitions for recordable injuries and lost
workday cases among this project's craft workers. If you do not track in accordance
with these definitions, write "UNK" in the recordable injuries and lost workday cases
columns.
• Write "UNK" in any space for which the information is unavailable or
incomplete.








18a. How many of the craft workhours reported in the table above were "overtime" (or





Safety includes the site-specific program and efforts to create a project environment and
state of consciousness which embraces the concept that all accidents are preventable and
that zero accidents is an obtainable goal. If this project was accident free, check "NA" as
appropriate for questions 27 through 30.
Yes No
19. This project had a written site-specific safety plan.
20. This project had a written site-specific emergency plan.
21. This project had a site safety supervisor.
22. The site safety supervisor for this project was full-time.
23. This project had a written safety incentive program for hourly craft
employees.
24. Toolbox safety meetings were required.
25. This project required prehire substance abuse testing of contractor
employees.
26. Contractor employees were randomly screened for alcohol and drugs.
27. Substance abuse tests were conducted after an accident:
Always Sometimes Seldom _ Never
28. Accidents were formally investigated:
Always Sometimes Seldom Never
NA
NA
29. Near-misses were formally investigated:
Always Sometimes Seldom Never NA
30. Senior management reviewed accidents:
Always Sometimes Seldom Never NA
31. Safety was a high priority topic at all pre-construction and construction meetings:
Always Sometimes Seldom Never
32. Safety records were a criterion for contractor/subcontractor selection:
101

Always Sometimes Seldom Never
33. Pre-task planning for safety was conducted by contractor foremen:
Always Sometimes Seldom Never
34. Jobsite-specific orientation was conducted for new contractor and subcontractor
employees:
Always Sometimes Seldom Never




Team Building is a process that brings together a diverse group of project participants
and seeks to resolve differences, remove roadblocks and proactively build and develop
the group into an aligned, focused and motivated work team that strives for a common
mission and for shared goals, objectives and priorities.
36. Was a team building process used for this project? Yes No
If yes, answer questions 36a - 36h. If no, go to question 37.
Yes No
36a. Was an independent consultant used to facilitate the team building
process?
36b. Was a team-building retreat held early in the life of the project?
36c. Did this project have a documented team-building implementation
plan?
36d. Were objectives of the team building process documented and
clearly defined?
36e. Were team building meetings held among team members throughout the project?
Regularly Sometimes Seldom
Never

























Constructability is the optimum use of construction knowledge and experience in
planning, design, procurement, and field operations to achieve overall project objectives.
Constructability is achieved through the effective and timely integration of construction
input into planning and design as well as field operations.
37. Was Constructability implemented on this project? Yes No
If yes, please respond to the following statements (37a-371 ). If no, go to question
38.
37a. Which of the following best describes the constructability program designation for
this project?
No designation
Part of standard construction management activities
Part of another program, such as Quality or only identified on a project
level
Recognized on a corporate level, but may be part of another program
Stand-alone program on same level as Quality or Safety
37b. Which of the following best describes the constructability training of personnel for
this project?
None
If any occurs, done as on-the-job training
Awareness seminar(s)
Part of standard orientation
Part of standard orientation; deeply ingrained in corporate culture
37c. Which of the following best describes the role of the constructability coordinator for
this project?
Coordinator not identified
Part-time if identified; very limited responsibility
Informal full- or part-time position; responsibilities vary
Formal full- or part-time position; responsibilities vary
Full-time position; plays major project role
37d. Which of the following best describes the constructability program documentation
for this project?
None; CII documents may be available




Project-level constructability documents exist; may be included in other
corporate documents
Project constructability manual is available
Project constructability manual is thorough, widely distributed, and
periodically updated
37e. Which of the following best describes the nature of project-level efforts and inputs
concerning constructability for this project?
None
Reactive approach, constrained by review mentality, poor understanding of
proactive benefit
Aware of major benefits, proactive approach
Proactive approach; routinely consult lessons learned
Aggressive, proactive approach from beginning of project; routinely consult
lessons learned
37f. Which of the following best describes the implementation of constructability
concepts on this project?
Very little concept implementation
Some concepts used periodically; often considered too late to be of use
Selected concepts applied regularly; full use, timeliness of input varies
All concepts consistently considered; timely implementation of feasible
concepts
All concepts consistently considered, continuously evaluated, aggressively
implemented



















Once every 3 Months
Once every 6 Months
Once a Year or Less Frequent
37j. Please indicate the time period of the first meeting that deliberately and explicitly












37k. Constructability was an element addressed in this project's formal
written execution plan.
371. Were the actual cost savings (identified cost savings less implementation
cost) due to the constructability program tracked on this project?




Pre-Project Planning involves the process of developing sufficient strategic information
with which owners can address risk and decide to commit resources to maximize the
chance for a successful project. Pre-project planning is often perceived as synonymous
with front-end loading, front-end planning, feasibility analysis, and conceptual planning.
Please respond to the following statements using the definition provided below the scale
for guidance (Questions 38a - 38d are for Contractors only.)
38e. Place a mark on the scale below that best describes the composition of the pre-
project planning team.
Excellent Poor
• Excellent - Highly skilled and experienced members with authority;
representation from business, project management, technical disciplines,
and operations; able to respond to both business and project objectives.
• Poor - Members with a poor combination of skill or experience that lack
authority; insufficient representation from business, project management,
technical disciplines, and operations; unable to respond to both business
and project objectives.
38f. Place a mark on the scale below that best describes the technology evaluation for
thi£^ilsnt Poor
• Excellent - Thorough and detailed identification and analysis of existing
and emerging technologies for feasibility and compatibility with
corporate business and operations objectives. Scale-up problems and
hands-on process experience were considered.
• Poor - Poor or no technology evaluation.
Excellent Poor





• Excellent - Thorough and detailed assessment of relative strengths and
weaknesses of alternate locations to meet owner requirements.
Excellent Poor
• Poor - Poor or no evaluation of alternate siting locations.
38h. Place a mark on the scale below that best describes the risk analysis performed for
project alternatives.
Excellent - Risks associated with the selected project alternatives were
identified and analyzed. These analyses included financial/business,
regulatory, project, and operational risk categories in order to minimize
the impacts of risks on project success.
Poor - Poor or no risk analysis performed for project alternatives.
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The Project Definition Rating Index (PDRI) identifies and describes critical elements in a
scope definition package and allows a project team to predict factors impacting project
risk. It is intended to evaluate the completeness of project scope definition prior to
consideration for authorization.
39. Was the Project Definition Rating Index (PDRI) utilized on this project? yes
no
If yes, indicate the score received just prior to total project budget authorization.
Please attach a copy of the PDRI scoresheet and proceed to question 40.
If no, please complete the following matrix using the appropriate definition levels given
below. Definition is provided for each of the pre-project planning elements on pages 4
through 1 1 of the glossary of terms. Indicate how well defined each element was prior to
the total project budget authorization by placing a check below the appropriate definition
level . Elements with definition levels 2 through 4 darkened should be answered as
"yes/no" questions. Indicate definition level 1 for "yes" or definition level 5 for "no" to
indicate if the elements either existed or did not exist within the project definition
package at authorization.
Definition Levels:
1 - Complete definition
definition
2 - Minor deficiencies
3 - Some deficiencies 5 - Incomplete or poor
4 - Major deficiencies N/A - Not applicable
Note: If the project on which you are reporting is a building or infrastructure project,
some of thefollowing elements may not apply to your project. Please place a check in
the "N/A " column to indicate "not applicable " ifany element does not apply to your
project.
Definition Level at Authorization
Com Poor
plete






Heat & Material Balances
Environmental Assessment



















Identify Long Lead/Critical Equip. &
Matl's
Project Control Requirements




Please place a check to indicate the extent to which each design/information technology
application listed below was used on this project. See the legend below for definition of
the "Use Levels." If you believe that an application could not have been appropriately
applied on this project check "NA."
Use Levels:
1 - Extensive Use
2 - Much Use
3 - Moderate Use
4 - Little Use
5 - No Use
N/A - Not applicable
40a. Was an integrated database utilized on this project? Yes No
If yes, please indicate the extent that each of the following shared data within the
integrated database. If other applications were used, please list them. If no,
proceed to question 40b.
Use Levels
Extensive Use No Use











40b. Was electronic data interchange (EDI) utilized on this project? Yes No
If yes, please indicate the extent to which each of the following document types
were transmitted using EDI. If other applications were used, please list them. If




Extensive Use No Use






40c. Was 3D CAD modeling utilized on this project? Yes No
If yes, please indicate the extent to which a 3D CAD model was used for each of
the following applications. If other applications were used, please list them. If
no, proceed to question 40d.
Use Levels
Extensive Use No Use
Applications 1 2 3 4 5 N/A








Use as reference during project /
coordination meetings
Work breakdown and estimating
Plan rigging or crane operations
Check installation clearances /
access

















Safety assessment / training
Plan temporary structures
(formwork, scaffolding, etc.)
Operation / Maintenance training






40d. Was bar coding utilized on this project? Yes No
If yes, please indicate the extent to which bar coding was used for each of the
following applications. If other application were used, please list them. If no,
proceed to question 41.
Use Levels
Extensive Use No Use









Project Change Management Practices
Change Management focuses on recommendations concerning the management
and control of both scope changes and project development changes.
Yes No
41a. Was a formal documented change management process, familiar to the
principal project participants used to actively manage changes on this
project?
41b. Was a baseline project scope established early in the project and frozen
with changes managed against this base?
41c. Were design "freezes" established and communicated once designs were
complete?
41d. Were areas susceptible to change identified and evaluated for risk during
review of the project design basis?
41e. Were changes on this project evaluated against the business drivers and
success criteria for the project?
41f. Were all changes required to go through a formal change justification
procedure?
41g. Was authorization for change mandatory before implementation?
41h. Was a system in place to ensure timely communication of change
information to the proper disciplines and project participants?
41i. Did project personnel take proactive measures to promptly settle,
authorize, and execute change orders on this project?
41j. Did the project contract address criteria for classifying change,
personnel authorized to request and approve change, and the basis for
adjusting the contract?
41k. Was a tolerance level for changes established and communicated to all
project participants?
411. Were all changes processed through one owner representative?
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41m. At project close-out, was an evaluation made of changes and their
impact on the project cost and schedule performance for future use as
lessons learned?
41n. Was the project organized in a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
format and quantities assigned to each WBS for control purposes prior
to total project budget authorization?
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